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CONTENTSAbstract
In this paper, I evaluate the performance deterioration that occurs when
the central bank employs an optimal targeting rule that is based on incorrect
parameter values. I focus on two parameters — the degree of inﬂation inertia
and the degree of price stickiness. I explicitly account for the eﬀects of the
structural parameters on the objective function used to evaluate outcomes,
as well as on the model’s behavioral equations. The costs of using simple
rules relative to the costs of parameter misspeciﬁcation are also assessed.
Keywords: Monetary Policy, Robustness, Misspeciﬁcation
JEL Classiﬁcation: E52, E58
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In this paper, I evaluate the eﬀects of parameter misspeciﬁcation on the
class of robustly optimal targeting rules implied by the ﬁrst order condi-
tions of the central bank’s decision problem. In contrast to most analyzes
of parameter uncertainty, I incorporate the consequences of parameter mis-
speciﬁcation both on the policy maker’s perceptions of the structural equa-
tions governing the determination of the endogenous variables and on the
loss function the central bank employs in deriving its optimal policy. This
contrasts with previous research where macroeconomic outcomes are evalu-
ated under the assumption that the policy maker has a ﬁxed (and known)
objective function. As recent theoretical work has shown, however, the ap-
propriate policy objective function itself will depend on the structural char-
acteristics of the economy. Thus, misspeciﬁcation of the model’s structural
parameters will also imply the objective function is misspeciﬁed.
I focus on misspeciﬁcation of two key parameters - the degree of struc-
tural inﬂation inertia and the degree of nominal price stickiness. There is
great uncertainty about the true values of each of these parameters, and each
is likely to have a signiﬁcant impact on policy design. Previous research has
found that it may pay central banks to err in the direction of overestimat-
ing inﬂation persistence. However these results are based on using a ﬁxed
objective function to evaluate outcomes.
I ﬁnd that the optimal targeting rule is robust to misspeciﬁcation of
inﬂation inertia. In part, this result arises because previous work has ignored
t h ei m p a c to fi n ﬂation inertia on the social loss function. The rule is not
as robust to misspecifying the degree of nominal price stickiness. However,
I ﬁnd that an assessment of the costs of misspecifying the degree of price
stickiness depends signiﬁcantly on whether one also accounts for the eﬀects
on the objective function that measures social welfare.
After assessing the robustness of robustly optimal targeting rules, I ex-
amine the cost of using a simple rule in the face of parameter misspeciﬁca-
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eﬀects of employing a simple rule in place of the fully optimal policy.
I focus on optimal diﬀerence rules as an example of a simple policy rule
that has previously been shown to perform well in a variety of models. For
uncertainty about the degree of inﬂation inertia, the simple rule was more
robust than the optimal targeting rule. However, for most combinations of
actual and perceived structural inﬂation inertia, the loss from using a simple
rule rather than the optimal targeting rule exceeded the costs arising from
parameter misspeciﬁcation. When the degree of nominal rigidity is poten-
tially misspeciﬁed, the simple rule’s performance deteriorated signiﬁcantly
if the policy maker thinks prices are relatively ﬂexible when in fact they are
quite sticky. For most combinations of actual and perceived price stickiness,
however, the loss from using a simple rule rather than the optimal targeting
rule exceeded the costs arising from parameter misspeciﬁcation.
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One objective of the large literature that has investigated uncertainty and
monetary policy has been to ﬁnd robust rules, rules that perform well even
when the policy maker has imperfect knowledge of the true structural equa-
tions that characterize the economy. One approach in this literature focuses
on model uncertainty and the performance of policy rules across diﬀerent
models. McCallum (1988, 1999) has long argued for evaluating policy pro-
posals in a variety of economic models as a means of assessing their robust-
ness, and Levin and Williams (2003a) and Levin, Wieland, and Williams
(2003) explore the performance of simple rules calibrated to be optimal
in one model when the true economy is described by a diﬀerent model.
However, most research has focused on uncertainty with respect to a given
reference model. For example, Brainard (1967) examined how the optimal
instrument rule of a Bayesian decision maker is altered when faced with para-
meter uncertainty.1 Using a new Keynesian model, Giannoni and Woodford
(2003a, 2003b) have analyzed instrument rules that are robust to misspec-
iﬁcation of the disturbance processes of a known model, while Hansen and
Sargent (2003) derive policies that are designed to be robust in the sense of
minimizing the worst case scenario when the policy maker believes the true
model is in a neighborhood of a given reference model.
In this paper, I evaluate the eﬀects of parameter misspeciﬁcation on the
class of robustly optimal targeting rules proposed by Svensson and Wood-
ford (2003) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003a, 2003b). In contrast to most
analyzes of parameter uncertainty, I incorporate the consequences of para-
meter misspeciﬁcation both on the policy maker’s perceptions of the struc-
tural equations governing the determination of the endogenous variables and
on the loss function the central bank employs in deriving its optimal pol-
icy. This contrasts with previous research where macroeconomic outcomes
are evaluated under the assumption that the policy maker has a ﬁxed (and
1Brainard (1967) showed how multiplicative uncertainty could lead to policy attenua-
tion. Craine (1979) and Södeström (2002) demonstrated that Brainard’s result does not
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the appropriate policy objective function itself will depend on the structural
characteristics of the economy (Woodford 2003). Thus, misspeciﬁcation of
the model’s structural parameters will also imply the objective function is
misspeciﬁed.
To date, Kimura and Kurozumi (2003), Kurozumi (2003), and Levin and
Williams (2003b) have incorporated the eﬀects of structural parameters on
the loss function into a Bayesian analysis of parameter uncertainty. These
authors focus on whether parameter uncertainty leads to more cautious or
more aggressive policy responses to shocks. Kimura and Kurozumi (2003)
and Kurozumi (2003) ﬁnd that, in contrast to the traditional attenuation
of policy found by Brainard (1967), responses tend to be more aggressive.
Levin and Williams show that multiplicative uncertainty about the elasticity
of inﬂation with respect to output may not lead to the traditional policy
attenuation when the eﬀects on the objective function are taken into account.
In contrast to these papers, I follow the approach of Angeloni, Coenen, and
Smets (2003) in focusing on what Coenen (2003) calls “uncertainty about
the rule-generating model.” That is, I investigate the consequences of basing
the optimal targeting rule on misspeciﬁed parameters.
I focus on misspeciﬁcation of two key parameters - the degree of struc-
tural inﬂation inertia and the degree of nominal price stickiness. There is
great uncertainty about the true values of each of these parameters, and
each is likely to have a signiﬁcant impact on policy design. Coenen (2003)
and Angeloni, Coenen, and Smets (2003) have found that it may pay cen-
tral banks to error in the direction of overestimating inﬂation persistence,
a result also found by Walsh (2003c). However these results are based on
using a ﬁxed objective function to evaluate outcomes.
After assessing the robustness of robustly optimal targeting rules, I ex-
amine the cost of using a simple rule in the face of parameter misspeciﬁca-
tion. I decompose this cost into two components: the eﬀects of parameter
misspeciﬁcation, conditional on implementing an optimal policy, and the
eﬀects of employing a simple rule in place of the fully optimal policy.
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optimal targeting rule of Giannoni and Woodford (2003a, 2003b) is derived.
The eﬀects of parameter misspeciﬁcation are investigated in section 4. In
section 5, the costs of employing a simple rule are compared to the costs of
parameter misspeciﬁcation. Conclusions are summarized in section 6.
2B a s i c m o d e l
The foundations of the benchmark new Keynesian model have been dis-
cussed extensively; I draw heavily on the formulation of Woodford (2003)
to which the reader is referred.2 The ﬁrst equation of the model relates the
output gap xt (output relative to the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level of out-
put) to its expected future value and the real interest rate gap, the diﬀerence
between the actual real interest rate and the natural real rate rn
t :





(it − Etπt+1 − rn
t ),( 1 )
where it is the nominal rate of interest and πt+1 is the inﬂation rate from t
to t +1 . For simplicity, assume rn is exogenous and evolves according to
rn
t = ρrrn
t−1 + vt, 0 ≤ ρr < 1.( 2 )
The innovation vt is white noise.
The second structural equation is an inﬂation adjustment equation. As
is well known, purely forward-looking models of inﬂation generally fail to
capture the empirical persistence actual inﬂation seems to display. Various
modiﬁcations that allow for greater inﬂation persistence while preserving the
tractability of the Calvo speciﬁcation have been explored in the literature.3
I follow Woodford (2003) in assuming that with probability 1 − α ﬁrms
optimally adjust their price and with probability α they simply index their
2See Walsh (2003a, Chapters 5 and 11) for further discussion of this model and addi-
tional references to the literature.
3For example, see Galí and Gertler (1999), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (forth-
coming), and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004).
The basic model, developed in the next section, is a standard new Keyne-
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leads to an inﬂation equation of the form
πt − γπt−1 = β (Etπt+1 − γπt)+κxt + et,( 3 )
where e is a cost shock that captures any factors that alter the relationship
between real marginal costs and the output gap.4 The cost shock is taken
to be exogenous, given by
et = ρeet−1 + εt, 0 ≤ ρe < 1.( 4 )
The innovation ε is white noise. In (3), the parameter β is the discount
rate, while κ is a function of the parameters governing the frequency of
price adjustment, the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output, and
the demand elasticity faced by individual producers. Speciﬁcally, if ω is the
elasticity of the representative agent’s utility with respect to output and ψ
is the price elasticity of demand facing the individual ﬁrm, then5
κ =
∙






where εmc is the elasticity of real marginal cost with respect to output.
The system consisting of (1) - (4) is closed by a speciﬁcation of monetary
policy. The central bank’s objective is to minimize a loss function that de-













t+i + λi(it+i − i∗)2¤
, (5)
where zt ≡ πt − γπt−1. Woodford (2003) discusses the conditions under
which (5) can be viewed as proportional to a second order approxima-
tion to the utility of the representative agent. He also shows that the
4As Woodford (2003, Ch. 6) shows, if real money balances and consumption are
nonseparable in utility, a term involving the nominal rate of interest also appears in the





Working Paper Series No. 477
April 2005weights λx and λi are functions of the underlying structural parameters
that describe preferences and price adjustment. Speciﬁcally, λx = κ/ψ and
λi =(¯ m/¯ Y )(ηiλx/εmc),w h e r e¯ m/¯ Y is the steady-state ratio of real money
balances to output, ηi is the interest rate semi-elasticity of money demand,
and εmc = σ + ω − χηy,w h e r eηy is the income elasticity of money de-
mand and χ is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to real money
holdings.
3 Robustly optimal targeting rules
Svensson and Woodford (2003) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003a, 2003b)
have analyzed a class of policy rules that Giannoni and Woodford describe
as robustly optimal. These rules are optimal in that the rule supports the
equilibrium consistent with an optimal commitment policy when evaluated
from the timeless perspective (Woodford 2003), and they are robust in that
the coeﬃcients in the policy rule are independent of the parameters that
characterize the behavior of the exogenous, stochastic disturbances. Thus,
the policy maker implementing such a rule does not need to know whether
disturbances are highly persistent or transitory or whether demand shocks
are more volatile than cost shocks.
The optimal commitment policy in the model consisting of (1) - (5) has
been well studied (Giannoni and Woodford 2003b, Svensson and Woodford
2003, Woodford 2003). Under commitment, the Lagrangian for the policy











t+i + λi(it+i − i∗)2¤
s1t+1+i (zt+i − βzt+1+i − κxt+i − et+i)
+s2t+1+i
∙





it+i − πt+1+i − rn
t+i
¢¸
+s3t+1+i (zt+i − πt+i + γπt−1+i)},( 6 )
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zt + s1t+1 − s1t + s3t+1 =0 ,( 7 )

















s2t+1 =0 . (10)
Under the fully optimal commitment policy, the multipliers s1t and s2t
are set to zero, as no previous commitments are binding in the ﬁrst period,
and both s1t+1 and s2t+1 are functions of the time t predetermined values.
Woodford has argued for adopting a “timeless perspective” in which s1t and
s2t, rather than being set equal to zero, satisfy the same ﬁrst order conditions
as the current and future multipliers do. Speciﬁcally, assume the optimal
commitment policy from a timeless perspective has been in place since at
least t − 2. Giannoni and Woodford (2003b) show that this assumption
allows one to eliminate the Lagrangian multipliers and obtain a targeting











[qt − βγEtqt+1], (11)
where A(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L given by
















and qt ≡ zt +( λx/κ)(xt − xt−1).6 Equation (11) is the Giannoni-Woodford
robustly optimal rule. As they emphasize, the coeﬃcients in (11) do not
depend on either the serial correlation coeﬃcients ρr and ρe or on the vari-
ances of the innovations to the disturbances. It is, therefore, robust with
respect to misspeciﬁcation of these aspects of the model. The equilibrium
6See the appendix for details.
where s1, s2,a n ds3 denote Lagrangian multipliers. The necessary ﬁrst order
12
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solution to equations (1) - (4) and (11).
As long as λi 6=0 , (11) can be expressed as an instrument rule for the
nominal rate of interest, although it is not an explicit recipe for setting it
since it depends both on other contemporaneous endogenous variables and
on expectations of the future value of i itself. In fact, (11) is a form of
the ﬁrst order condition for the central bank’s optimal policy problem, and
Svensson (2004) has argued for describing such conditions as targeting rules
rather than instrument rules. This more general terminology recognizes that
even when λi =0 , so that the instrument it does not appear directly in the
ﬁrst order condition, one can still derive a robustly optimal rule.7 Woodford
(2003) also describes a relationship such as (11) as a target criterion.
Woodford (2003) stresses the robustness of the targeting rule given by
(11) to misspeciﬁcation of the disturbance processes, but, interestingly, it
is also the targeting rule that implements the optimal robust policy in the
robust control sense of Hansen and Sargent (2004). In a series of papers,
Hansen and Sargent, together with coauthors, have explored robust control
approaches to the decision problem of agents who face model uncertainty
(Hansen and Sargent 2003, 2004). In the approach they develop, the central
bank views its model as an approximation to the true model of the economy,
knowing only that the true model is in a neighborhood around its approx-
imating model.8 Robust policies, in the sense of Hansen and Sargent, are
min-max policies, designed to perform well in worst-case scenarios.9 Despite
this contrast with the standard rational expectations approach to optimal
7In the present case, if λi =0 ,t h ec e n t r a lb a n k ’ sﬁrst order conditions imply that the
following condition must hold:






8Alternative approaches to robust control have been explored by Stock (1999), Gian-
noni (2002), Onatski and Stock (2002), and Onatski and Williams (2003).
9Hansen and Sargent (2004, Chapter 15) apply their robust control methodology to
Woodford’s forward-looking new Keynesian model, and Giordani and Söderlind (2003)
report some simulations of a basic new Keynesian model under robust min-max policies.
Some policy implications of this approach are discussed in Walsh (2003c).
13
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worst case scenario when the public’s and the central bank’s expectations
coincide. This equivalence of policy rules is demonstrated for a basic new
Keynesian model without structural inﬂation inertia and with λi =0in
Walsh (forthcoming); this equivalence extends to the present model.
While (11) characterizes optimal policy in either the standard (timeless
perspective) optimal commitment case or in the min-max robust control
analysis of Hansen and Sargent, the equilibrium behavior of inﬂation and
output diﬀers in the two cases. It does so because expectations are formed
diﬀerently. The standard policy problem that Giannoni and Woodford ana-
lyze assumes expectations are formed rationally. In the Hansen and Sargent
approach, expectations about future outcomes are based on worst-case sce-
narios.
The equivalence of targeting rules under alternative approaches to uncer-
tainty suggests that the practice of characterizing the eﬀects of model uncer-
tainty in terms of whether it leads the policy maker to react more cautiously
or more aggressively to inﬂation and output may fail to adequately capture
the impacts of uncertainty. For example, implementing (11) achieves the
optimal policy of a policy maker with a concern for robustness in the sense
of Hansen and Sargent, but the coeﬃcients in the rule are independent of
the policy maker’s preference for robustness. While two policy makers may
have very diﬀerent preferences for robustness, both could implement their
optimal policies by ensuring that (11) holds. Hence, diﬀering attitudes to-
wards uncertainty may not always aﬀe c tt h ew a yi nw h i c hp o l i c ys h o u l db e
optimally adjusted to current and expected future values of inﬂation and
the output gap.
4 Parameter robustness
While the robustly optimal rule is designed to protect against misspeciﬁca-
tion in the shock processes, the coeﬃcients of the targeting rule depend on
the underlying structural parameters of the model. Thus, implementing the
rule requires knowledge of the structural parameters. In this section, I focus
14
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the rule on parameter values that are misspeciﬁed. Examining the sensitiv-
ity of macroeconomic outcomes to parameter misspeciﬁcation provides one
means of assessing the robustness of a rule. I focus on two parameters for
which a wide range of values have been employed in the literature. These are
the degree of structural inﬂation inertia, γ, and the degree of price stickiness,
α.
By misspecifying a structural parameter, the policy maker is subject to
two types of errors. First, the structural parameters aﬀect the coeﬃcients in
the policy rule, so employing incorrect values for these parameters directly
distorts the coeﬃcients in the policy rule. This source of error has been the
focus of previous work; for example Coenen (2003) and Angeloni, Coenen
and Smets (2003) investigate the consequences of employing a rule that is
optimized for an incorrect representation of inﬂation persistence.
However, there is a second source of potential error; the loss function
on which policy is based may be incorrect, as it is itself a function of the
structural parameters. The loss function may be misspeciﬁed because the
wrong variables appear in it. For instance, if the degree of structural inﬂation
inertia is misspeciﬁed, the wrong quasi-diﬀerence of inﬂation will appear in
the loss function. Or it may be misspeciﬁed because the weights assigned
to diﬀerent objectives may be wrong; if the degree of nominal rigidity is
misspecifed, the weights λx and λi will be incorrect.
Suppose the policy maker implements the rule that is optimal based on
a perceived set of parameter values. Denote these values with a superscript
P. One approach to investigating the impact of parameter misspeciﬁcation
is to solve the model consisting of the structural equations (1) and (4) and







































(xt − xt−1). N o t et h a tw h i l eI
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and λi,a n dt h ef o r mo fqt depends on γ.
Implementing a misspeciﬁed policy rule when the optimal targeting rule
involves expectations of future variables, as in (11), is not straightforward.
As pointed out by Onatski and Williams (2004), simply combining a rule
based on incorrect parameters with the true structural equations to solve
for the rational expectations equilibrium would implicitly allow policy to be
based on forecasts which, in turn, are based on a knowledge of the true struc-
tural coeﬃcients.10 An alternative approach is to recast the policy rule into
a form that does not directly depend on expectations of future endogenous
variables. In equilibrium, the nominal rate of interest will be a function of
the model’s predetermined variables, but, as is well known (Woodford 2003),
employing a rule that only involves predetermined variables does not ensure
determinacy.
To obtain an optimal instrument rule that is also consistent with a deter-
minate solution, I adopt the following approach.11 Let δ denote the vector of
“true” structural parameter values. Let Yt =[ et rn
t πt−1]0 and let φt =[ s1t
s2t]0,w h e r es1 and s2 are the Lagrangian multipliers on the inﬂation adjust-
ment and expectational IS equations respectively in the policy optimization
problem (see 6). The appendix shows that when policy is based on the true














where the notation indicates that the matrices that characterize the solution
depend on the parameter vector δ. In addition, the equilibrium behavior of
the Lagrangian multiplier s3 in (6) is given by
s3t = C31(δ)Yt + C32(δ)χ2t. (14)
10Alternatively, one might interpret the policy maker as employing empirical forecasting
equations to form expectations and that the relevant equilibrium is one in which these
forecasting equations coincide with rational expectations, even though the policy maker
has incorrect estimates of the underlying structural parameters.
11See also Onatski and Williams (2004).
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where the matrices C∗
31(δ) and C∗
32(δ) are deﬁned in the appendix.
Now let δP denote policy maker’s perceived value for δ.T h ei n s t r u m e n t







πt − γPπt−1 +
λP
x


























φ2t+1 = M21(δP)Yt + M22(δP)φ2t. (17)
Equilibrium under the misspeciﬁed parameters is obtained by solving for the
rational expectations solution to (1) - (4), (16), and (17).
To investigate the impact of parameter misspeciﬁcation, I solve a cali-
brated version of the model for α = αP and γ = γP to obtain the matrices
in (??) and (17). Then, holding the coeﬃcients in these two equations ﬁxed,
I jointly solve (1) - (4), (16), and (17) for values of α (γ) in (1) and (3)
ranging from 0.05 to 0.95 (0 to 1). I then calculate the value of the loss
function using the weights λx and λi for the appropriate value of α (γ).
The baseline parameter values are taken from Giannoni and Woodford
(2003b) and Woodford (2003) and are reported in Table 1.12 While most
12All values are based on specifying both the structural equations and the loss function
at quarter rates. Woodford typically speciﬁes the structural equations at quarterly rates
and the loss function in terms of inﬂation at annual rates. This would require multiplying
17
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 477
April 2005of these parameter values are fairly standard, the value for the coeﬃcient of
relative risk averse (σ =0 .16) is much lower than other researchers typically
assume or the empirical evidence on the elasticity of output with respect
to the real rate of interest suggests (e.g., Dennis 2003).13 A more common
value for σ would be in the range from 1 (log utility) to 5. Woodford’s choice
of 0.16 is based on estimates reported in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
Table 1: Parameter Values
Structural Parameters Implied Values
α 0.66 κ 0.024
β 0.99 λx 0.003
γ 0.50 λi 0.077




ηy 1 σv 0.0093
¯ v 7.25 σε 0.0041
χ 0.02 ρr 0.35
ρe 0
The unconditional expected value of the loss function given by (5) is de-
noted by V (δ,δP,R),w h e r eR will index the form of the rule, either robustly
optimal (ROR) or, in section 5, optimal simple rule (SR). The percentage







where V (δ,δ,ROR) denotes the value of the social loss function as a func-
tion of the actual parameters when the optimal commitment policy rule is
λx by 16 (so that λx =0 .048, the value reported by Woodford).
13A value of σ =0 .16 implies a coeﬃcient of 6.25 on the interest rate in the IS rela-
tionship. Expressing the interest rate at an annual rate would reduce this value to 1.56,
although this is still well above most estimates.
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of the parameter space over which misspeciﬁcation is particularly costly.
However, the unscaled function lnV (δ,δP,R) is also informative in that it
can highlight whether it is beneﬁcial to systematically err in the direction
of over- or under-estimating a parameter.
4.1 Structural inﬂation inertia
T h ed e g r e eo fs t r u c t u r a li n ﬂation inertia has been the focus of a great deal of
empirical research, and while this work ﬁnds persistent movements of inﬂa-
tion are a feature of the data, no consensus has been reached on the reason
for it. Among the models commonly used for policy analysis are ones that
assume only forward-looking inﬂation behavior (Woodford 2003) and ones
that assume inﬂation is a purely backward-looking phenomenon (Rudebusch
and Svensson 1999). The nature of the inﬂation process and the degree of
endogenous structural inertia in the inﬂation process has been identiﬁed as
one of the most critical parameters aﬀecting the evaluation of alternative
policies. For example, Rudebusch (2002) found that nominal income target-
ing does well when inﬂation is forward-looking but poorly when it is more
backward-looking. Similarly, when current inﬂation is aﬀected by both ex-
pected future inﬂation and lagged inﬂation, the performance of price-level
targeting deteriorates signiﬁcantly as the relative weight on lagged inﬂation
rises (Walsh 2003b). Levin and Williams (2003a) demonstrate that policy
rules that are optimal in a forward-looking model can lead to disastrous
results if the true model is in fact backward-looking.
Unfortunately, given the signiﬁcance it has for the evaluation of alterna-
tive policies, there is great uncertainty about the respective roles of forward
and backward elements in the inﬂation process. For example, Rudebusch
(2002) uses an output gap measure based on de-trended output and esti-
mates the weight on lagged inﬂation to be over twice that on expected future
inﬂation, while Galí and Gertler (1999), using a measure of real marginal
cost rather than the output gap, ﬁnd essentially the reverse.
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estimate of γ, ﬁgure 1 shows lnV (γ,γP,ROR), the (log) loss when the in-
ﬂation equation and social welfare depend on γ but policy is characterized
by the optimal targeting rule for a value γP. Along the diagonal, γ = γP,
corresponding to the case of no speciﬁcation error. In this case, loss is in-
creasing in γ,r e ﬂecting the poorer trade-oﬀ f a c e db yt h ep o l i c ym a k e ra s
inﬂation becomes more backward-looking. The surface shown in the ﬁgure
is fairly symmetric, indicating that when structural inﬂation inertia is mis-
speciﬁed, the costs of under-estimating γ are only slightly higher than those
arising from over-estimating it. This diﬀers from the ﬁndings reported in
Walsh (2003c), where the costs of underestimating γ were found to be larger,
and in Coenen (2003) and Angeloni, Coenen, and Smets (2003), who also
ﬁnd that it is better to over-estimate inﬂation inertia. However in those
papers, a standard quadratic loss function was employed. In the present
model, the loss depends on πt −γπt−1 and so varies with γ.Ap o l i c ym a k e r
concerned with minimizing the worst-case outcome would do best, however,
by assuming inﬂation is relatively inertial; a value of γP =0 .65 minimizes
maxγ lnV (γ,γP,ROR).
Figure 2 plots µ∗(γ, γP,ROR), the percentage deterioration in loss.
Along the diagonal, γ = γP,a n dµ∗(γ, γP,ROR)=0by deﬁnition. The
largest percentage deterioration occur when inﬂation is not persistent (γ is
close to zero), but the central bank designs its policy under the assumption
that inﬂation is predominately backward-looking (γP close to one). The
maximum cost of misspecifying the degree of inﬂation inertia is just un-
der 11%; thus, the costs of misspecifying the degree of inﬂation inertia are
relatively small under the ROR rule.
4.2 The degree of price stickiness
The degree of price stickiness, α,a ﬀects both the structural parameter κ that
appears in the inﬂation adjustment equation and, through κ,t h ew e i g h t sλx
and λi. In most previous work analyzing the robustness of policy to uncer-
tainty about model parameters, changes in the structural parameters were
In the present model, the degree of structural inﬂation inertia is mea-
20
ECB




















































Working Paper Series No. 477
April 2005not allowed to aﬀect the weights in the loss function.14 Incorporating the
dependence of λx and λi on α w i l lt u r no u tt oh a v ei m p o r t a n ti m p l i c a t i o n s
for the robustness of ROR policy rules.
I begin, however, by following the standard approach, treating λx and λi
as ﬁxed at their baseline values as α varies. Thus, only the output elasticity
of inﬂation, κ, is allowed to change with α.T h e ROR rule coeﬃcients
are based on the central bank’s perceived value αP w h i l et h ev a l u ei nt h e
structural equations is α.
Figure 3 shows log loss as a function of α and αP. Loss is sensitive to the
value of αP employed in the policy rule, with performance deteriorating by
about 600% if the policy maker assumes α is small (little nominal rigidity)
when it is in fact large. A policy maker employing a min-max strategy would
wish to conduct policy as if α were large. By designing policy as if prices
were very sticky (0.7 is the min-max value of αP), the worst outcome, which
occurs when α is actually small, results in only a small deterioration in the
loss function.
The experiment lying behind ﬁgure 3 assumed the weights in the social
loss function were independent of α. However, greater nominal price rigidity
makes inﬂation variability more costly, and therefore inﬂation stabilization
becomes relatively more important. Thus, λx (and λi) is a decreasing func-
tion of α.
The importance of allowing the weights to vary is seen by comparing
ﬁgure 3, the loss with ﬁxed weights, to ﬁgure 4, the loss when the weights
λx and λi are allowed to vary with α. The results change dramatically. Now,
overestimating the degree of price stickiness results in a signiﬁcantly greater
deterioration of outcomes then the reverse. The loss from assuming prices
are very sticky is large if prices are in fact fairly ﬂexible. The min-max
policy rule is the one based on the assumption of fairly ﬂexible prices (a
value of 0.05 for αP).
14As noted earlier, exceptions are Kimura and Kurozumi (2003), Kurozumi (2003), and
Levin and Williams (2003b).
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Figure 4: lnV (α,αP,ROR)
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T h er e a s o nf o rt h ed r a m a t i cc h a n g ei nc o n c l u s i o n sw h e nt h ep o l i c y
weights are endogenized is that both λx and λi decrease monotonically with
α.15 As a consequence, the policy based on a small αP is designed to place
greater weight on output gap and interest rate stabilization relative to the
case when αP is large. When α is underestimated (so αP <α ), policy ends
up generating more output gap and interest rate variability then if policy
had been based on a correctly speciﬁed value of α.W i t h λx and λi ﬁxed
rather than declining with the larger α, this excessive output gap volatility
leads to a large deterioration in the loss function.
Figure 5 shows µ∗(α,αP,ROR), the percentage loss due to parame-
ter misspeciﬁcation, when the structural parameters and the loss function
weights (κ, λx,a n dλi) are all allowed to vary as the degree of price stickiness
changes.
15λx (λi)d e c l i n e sf r o m2.974 (7.7881)w h e nα =0 .05 to 0.0001 (0.0014)w h e nα =0 .95.
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The analysis in the previous sections assumed policy was optimal, given
the central bank’s model speciﬁcation. Much of the recent literature on
monetary policy has instead focused on the implications of simple rules, the
Taylor rule being of course the most famous (Taylor 1993). In a simple rule,
the policy instrument is adjusted in response to a small number of variables,
typically the output gap, inﬂation, and the lagged nominal interest rate. In
optimal simple rules, the response coeﬃcients are chosen to minimize the
expected value of the loss function.
When policy is based on a simple rule and there is uncertainty about
the true model parameters, macroeconomic outcomes will be ineﬃcient rel-
ative to the full information case for two reasons. First, if the simple rule
is optimized for parameter values that are in fact incorrect, loss will exceed
that achievable under full information. Second, even if the true model para-
meter values are known, loss under a simple rule will exceed that attainable
under the ROR rule. In this section, these two sources of ineﬃciency are
investigated.
5.1 Decomposing the loss function
Let V (δ,δP,SR) denote the value of the loss function when the actual pa-
rameter vector is δ and the central bank implements policy via a simple
rule that minimizes the social loss function under the assumption that δP is
the vector of parameters that characterize the model. When a simple rule
is employed and the rule is based on an incorrect estimate of a structural
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In this form, the loss due to misspeciﬁcation when using a simple rule is
equal to the eﬀects of parameter misspeciﬁcation, given the simple rule is
used, plus the ineﬃciency of the simple rule relative to the ROR rule, given
that there is no parameter misspeciﬁcation. Both µ∗(δ,δP,SR) and θ(δ,δ)
are non-negative.












where θ(δ,δP) is the loss in eﬃciency from using a simple rule rather than
the ROR rule, given the misspeciﬁcation of policy, and µ∗(δ,δP,ROR) is the
measure previously used to measure the cost of parameter misspeciﬁcation
under the optimal targeting rule. The costs of failing to optimize fully is
measured by θ; the costs of failing to estimate correctly is measured by
µ∗. N o t et h a tw h i l eµ and µ∗ are both non-negative, θ may be positive
or negative. A negative value would indicate that the simple rule is more
robust to misspeciﬁcation than the ROR rule.
The loss under a simple rule will depend on the exact speciﬁcation of
the simple rule. I focus on a class of diﬀerence rules of the form
it = it−1 + aππt + ax (xt − xt−1). (18)
Rules of this form have been shown to perform well in a variety of models
(e.g., Orphanides and Williams 2002, Levin, Wieland, and Williams 2003,
Levin and Williams 2003a, Walsh 2003c). They are equivalent to a level
rule in which the nominal interest rate is adjusted in response to the out-
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April 2005put gap and the price level. The diﬀerence rule imparts an inertia to the
interest rate that is absent under a Taylor speciﬁcation, and this inertia can
improve policy trade-oﬀs in forward-looking models (Vestin 2000, Walsh
2003b, Woodford 2003). For each speciﬁcation of the model, the parameters
aπ and ax are chosen to minimize the unconditional expected value of the
loss function given by (5).
5.2 Structural inﬂation inertia
We have already seen from the plot of µ∗(γ,γP,ROR) in ﬁgure 2 that the
costs of misspecifying the degree of inﬂation inertia are small when the ROR
rule is followed. Figure 6 shows the corresponding plot of µ∗(γ,γP,SR). The
vertical scale is the same in the two ﬁgures. It is clear that the optimal simple
rule is much less sensitive to parameter misspeciﬁcation than the robustly
optimal ROR rule.
Figure 7 shows θ(γ,γP), the additional (percentage) loss that arises from
employing an optimal simple rule of the form (18) rather than the fully
optimal ROR rule. Notice that along the diagonal, θ(γ,γ) is increasing in
γ, indicating that the performance of the simple rule deteriorates, relative
to the ROR rule, as inﬂation becomes more inertial (γ increases). The
deterioration rises from 6% to 18% as γ increases from zero to one.
Comparing ﬁgures 2 and 7 reveals that the percentage loss associated
with the suboptimal rule is generally of the same order of magnitude as the
loss due to parameter misspeciﬁcation under the ROR rule.16
A na l t e r n a t i v em e a s u r eo ft h ec o s t so fas i m p l er u l ev e r s u st h ec o s t so f







16Recall that the total percentage loss using a simple rule is obtained by adding the
surface in ﬁgure 7 to the surface in ﬁgure 2.
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Figure 7: θ(γ,γP):T h ee ﬃciency cost of an optimal diﬀerence rule relative
to the ROR rule
28
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 477
April 2005the percentage share of the total ineﬃciency that is due to using the simple
rule. When δP = δ, this measure equals 100%, since the only source of
ineﬃciency is due to the use of the simple rule. As shown in ﬁgure 8, the
share of the loss attributed to using a simple rule rather than the ROR
rule drops oﬀ relatively quickly when γP >γbut it declines more gradually
when γP <γ . However, for most combinations of γ and γP,t h es u r f a c e
exceeds 50%, implying the ineﬃciency of the simple rule is greater than that
associated with parameter misspeciﬁcation. An alternative way to assess the
eﬃciency loss due to the simple rule is to calculate the share of the loss given
by s(γ,γP) if γP = γ ± ε for various values of ε. For example, Galí and
Gertler (1999) report two alternative structural estimates of their hybrid
inﬂation model which yield coeﬃcients on lagged inﬂation that correspond
to values for γ of 0.33 and 0.61, a spread of 0.28.T a k i n gε as 0.3, s(γ,γP)
exceeds 88%, suggesting that with respect to structural inﬂation inertia, it
is generally more important to employ an optimal targeting rule than it is
to get the exact value of γ correct.
5.3 The degree of price stickiness
Turning now to the eﬀects of misspecifying the value of α under the optimal
diﬀerence rule, ﬁgure 9 shows θ(α,αP). Along the diagonal, θ(α,α) is de-
creasing in α, indicating that the performance of the simple rule improves,
relative to the ROR rule, as prices becomes more sticky (α increases). Com-
paring this ﬁgure to µ∗(α,αP,ROR) in ﬁgure 5 highlights two conclusions.
When policy is based on the assumption of very sticky prices when in fact
prices are ﬂexible, the use of the simple rule adds little to the overall costs
of misspeciﬁcation. However, when policy is based on the assumption of
very ﬂexible prices when in fact prices are quite sticky, the costs of mis-
speciﬁcation are due primarily to the use of a simple rule. Performance

























































Figure 9: θ(α,αP):T h ee ﬃciency loss from using an optimal diﬀerence rule
relative to the ROR rule
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Figure 10: Share of total eﬃciency cost due to use of optimal diﬀerence rule
The share of θ(α,αP) in the total loss associated with a simple rule and
misspeciﬁcation of α is shown in ﬁgure 10. The sharp peak along the diag-
onal indicates that the ineﬃciency due to the simple rule drops oﬀ quickly
when α is misspeciﬁed. However, it is still the case that the surface in ﬁgure
10 exceeds 50% for most combinations of α and αP, again indicating that
the gains from employing an optimal rule exceed those of improving the
estimate of α.
As was the case with γ, one can calculate the share of the loss given by
s(α,αP) if αP = α ± ε. Again taking ε =0 .317, s(α,αP) exceeds 78% for
all α − ε ≤ αP ≤ α,w h i l es(α,αP) exceeds 47% for all α ≤ αP ≤ α + ε,
reﬂecting the improvement of the simple rule relative to the robustly optimal
targeting rule when the central bank over-estimates α.
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To investigate the consequences of basing an optimal (explicit) instrument
rule on incorrect values of the structural parameters, I employed a calibrated
new Keynesian model in which the weights in the social loss function are
functions of the model’s structural parameters. Thus, employing incorrect
parameter values means that the structural equations and the loss function,
both of which are important determinants of the targeting rule, will be
misspeciﬁed.
I focused on two key parameters, the degree of inﬂation inertia and the
degree of price stickiness. In contrast to previous results which ﬁnd policy
outcomes to be sensitive to the degree of inﬂation inertia, I ﬁnd that the
Giannoni-Woodford optimal rule is robust to misspeciﬁcation of inﬂation
inertia. In part, this result arises because previous work has ignored the
impact of inﬂation inertia on the social loss function. The rule is not as
robust to misspecifying the degree of nominal price stickiness.
Finally, I assess the robustness of optimal diﬀerence rules as an example
of a simple policy rule that has previously been shown to perform well. For
uncertainty about the degree of inﬂation inertia, the simple rule was more
robust than the optimal targeting rule. However, for most combinations of
actual and perceived structural inﬂation inertia, the loss from using a simple
rule rather than the optimal targeting rule exceeded the costs arising from
parameter misspeciﬁcation. When the degree of nominal rigidity is poten-
tially misspeciﬁed, the simple rule’s performance deteriorated signiﬁcantly
if the policy maker thinks prices are relatively ﬂexible when in fact they are
quite sticky. For most combinations of actual and perceived price stickiness,
however, the loss from using a simple rule rather than the optimal targeting
rule exceeded the costs arising from parameter misspeciﬁcation.
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April 2005Appendix: Robustly optimal rules
The ﬁrst order conditions (8) and (10) imply





























(it−1 − i∗)+βγEts3t+2. (21)
Letting ∆ denote the ﬁrst diﬀerence operator, (7) becomes s3t+1 = −(zt + ∆s1t+1),
which with (21) gives





(it−1 − i∗)+βγEt (zt+1 + ∆s1t+2). (22)
First diﬀerencing (20) to eliminate ∆s1t+1 and Et∆s1t+2 in (22) yields the
robustly optimal targeting rule given by (11), where qt ≡ zt +( λx/κ)∆xt.
To obtain a targeting rule that does not involve expectations of future











∆it−1 + s3t+1 =0 . (23)
















(it−1 − i∗)+βγEts3t+2 =0 .
Solving for it gives a policy rule in which expectations of the future appear
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April 2005In the rational expectations solution,
s3t = C31Yt + C32φ2t





























































































φ2t+1 = M21Yt + M22φ2t
represent a system in it and φ2t+1 that the central bank can solve for its
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April 2005To implement this approach, the model is ﬁrst solved under the assump-
tion that the policy rule is based on the correct values of the structural
parameters. This solution provides the values of the Mij(δ) and C∗
3j(δ)
matrices, where δ denotes the vector of parameter values. When policy is






















































t = zt +( γ − γP)πt−1,
and the resulting system is solved for the equilibrium. In this setup, s1t and

















where ˆ Yt =[ s1t s2t et rn
t it−2 it−1 πt−1 xt−1]0 is an expanded list of prede-
termined variables and yt =[ zt xt]0.
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